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Indian Law-CRIMINAL JURISDICTION-TRIBAL COURTS HAVE 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER No~-h~~A~s-Ol iphan t  U. Schlie, 
544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977). 
Mark David Oliphant, a non-Indian, was arrested on August 
19, 1973, by Suquamish tribal police on the Port Madison Indian 
Reservation in the State of Washingt0n.l He was charged with 
assaulting an officer and resisting arrest,l and then incarceratecL3 
Before trial, Oliphant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the United States District Court, Western District of Washing- 
ton, claiming that Indian tribal courts have no criminal jurisdic- 
tion over non-Indian~.~ The district court denied the pe t i t i~n ,~  
and Oliphant appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for 
1. The criminal acts with which Oliphant was charged were committed on lands 
located within Indian country but leased by the Suquamish Tribe to a Washington State 
corporation. The concept of Indian country was discussed by the district court and will 
not be treated in this case note. Oliphant v. Schlie, No. 511-73C2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 
1974), aff'd,  544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977). For a general discussion of what constitutes Indian 
country, see F. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK F FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 5-8 (1971). 
2. The tribe claimed that the authority to try Oliphant before the tribal court was 
derived from its Law and Order Code. The code provides: 
The Tribal Court of the Port Madison Reservation shall have original juris- 
diction over . . . [all1 crimes committed within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the Port Madison Reservation and all other Tribally owned lands, . . . except 
the major crimes as defined by the Act of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat. 362) as 
amended which are within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe Law & Order Code, ch. 1, art. ID, § 3 (1973). The Suquamish 
Law and Order Code allows for a trial de novo to a tribal court of appeals except as to 
those issues decided by a jury at the tribal court level. Id. art. 11, 8 2. 
On the other hand, Oliphant could have been charged in federal court for assaulting 
the tribal police officer under "one or several of the following federal statutes:" 18 U.S.C. 
§ § 111, 113, 1114,1152 (1970). Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975). 
3. Pursuant to a previously existing agreement with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the 
city of Bremerton provided jail facilities for holding tribal prisoners. Oliphant v. Schlie, 
No. 511-73C2, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 1974). 
4. Oliphant v. Schlie, No. 511-73C2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 1974). The fact that Oli- 
phant lived within the Indian reservation, Brief for Petitioner at 10, Oliphant v. Schlie, 
No. 76-5729 (US. Nov. 22, 1976), might have been deemed as giving implied consent for 
submission to the jurisdiction of the tribal court. See Article, The Allocation of Criminal 
Jurisdiction in Indian Country-Federal, State and Tribal Relationships, 8 U. CAL. D.L. 
REV. 431, 448-50 (1975); 18 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 461, 461-63 (1974) (supporting territorial 
jurisdiction of Indian courts). The Ninth Circuit, however, did not consider this issue in 
the instant case. 
5. Oliphant v. Schlie, No. 511-73C2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 1974). 
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the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-Indians afe subject 
to Indian tribal court jurisdiction since Congress has never ex- 
pressly taken this jurisdiction away from Indians.' The United 
States Supreme Court has since granted Oliphant's petition for 
certiorari .7 
Indian law is a complex potpourri of federal, state, and tribal 
law. In criminal matters, the applicable law can be determined 
only after identifying the person who committed the act, the na- 
ture of the criminal act, and the location of the crime. Continual 
changes in congressional policies and federal and tribal laws fur- 
ther complicate the criminal jurisdiction issue. 
To lay the foundation for an analysis of the instant case, this 
section will examine the doctrine of original tribal sovereignty 
and explore its meaning and scope, discuss the disputed matter 
of statutory jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes 
upon Indians within Indian country, and present a brief overview 
of the concept of Indian self-government as modified by congres- 
sional policy from the early 1800's to the present. 
A. Tribal Self-Government Under the Doctrine of Residual 
So v ereignty8 
Prior to the colonization of America, Indian tribes possessed 
full sovereignty over their land and members. Following con- 
quest, Indians became subject to congressional regulation as pro- 
vided by the Constit~tion,~ and the tribes' external powers of 
sovereignty ceased. The tribes' internal powers of sovereignty, 
however, remained.1° Subsequent treaties," statutes,12 and federal 
6. 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976). 
7. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977). 
8. The term "residual sovereignty" is used to convey the concept of original Indian 
sovereignty that has been limited through subsequent action by the United States. See 
note 14 and accompanying text infra. 
9. Although the President of the United States is authorized to make treaties, U.S. 
CONST. art. 2, § 2, treatymaking with Indians has now ceased. Notes 11,51 and accompa- 
nying text infra. Responsibility for governing Indians is vested in the Congress of the 
United States by constitutional provision: "The Congress shall have power . . . To regu- 
late Commerq with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
10. For an explanation of the terms "external" and "internal" powers, see F. COHEN, 
supra note 1, at 122-26, 273-77. 
11. For a discussion of the history and legal force of Indian treaties, see OFFICE OF THE 
SOLICITOR, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 138-214 (1958) 
[hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. 
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administrative regulations13 further diminished Indian sover- 
eignty by limiting the internal powers of the Indian tribes. Pres- 
ently, Indian tribes are considered wards of the federal govern- 
ment and retain only residual sovereignty.14 
The concept of tribal residual sovereignty is derived from two 
nineteenth century Supreme Court cases. In Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, l5 Chief Justice Marshall clarified the special position 
given Indian tribes in the United States. Quoting the Constitu- 
tion, Marshall asserted that Indian tribes are distinct from both 
"foreign Nations" and the individual states: "They may, more 
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations 
. . . in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States 
resembles that  of a ward to his guardian? In Worcester v. 
Georgia, l7 Marshall refined his earlier pronouncement on the sta- 
tus of Indian tribes, likening them to conquered nations: "The 
Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, indepen- 
dent political communities . . . . [Tlhe settled doctrine of the 
law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its 
independence-its right to self-government, by associating with 
a stronger [nation] . . . . "18 
These passages and cases have generally been accepted to 
stand for the proposition that Indian tribes, within the limits 
imposed by the federal government, have the right to govern 
12. The authority of Congress to pass legislation affecting Indians is inferred from 
Congress' constitutional charge to regulate the commerce of the Indian tribes. See note 9 
and accompanying text supra. Titles 18 and 25 of the United States Code embody the 
majority of the statutes affecting Indians and Indian tribes. For a general discussion of 
this topic, see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 89-100. 
13. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs is empowered to promulgate regulations 
bearing on Indian affairs. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). For a general discussion of administrative 
powers over Indian affairs, see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 100-15. 
14. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, a t  398 (footnote omitted): 
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers 
is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe 
possessed, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign State. (2) Con- 
quest rendered the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States 
and, in substance, terminated the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, 
e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but did not by itself 
terminate the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self- 
government. (3) These internal powers were, of course, subject to qualification 
by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly 
qualified, many powers of internal sovereignty have remained in the Indian 
tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government. 
15. 30 US .  (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
16. Id. at 17. 
17. 31 US.  (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
18. Id. at 559-61. 
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themselves free from encroachment on internal- tribal powers by 
state governments.lg Thus, Indian tribes may form their own gov- 
e r n m e n t ~ , ~ ~  pass and enforce their own  ordinance^,^' exlude non- 
members of the tribeZZ and trespassersz3 from their reservations, 
regulate business transacted on the reservation," create tribal 
courts,25 and exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over their 
members .26 
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has limited the 
application of the doctrine of residual sovereignty. In 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,z7 the Court ob- 
served that "modern cases . . . tend to avoid reliance on platonic 
notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable 
- - 
19. E.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 
376,383-84 (1896); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 
,599 (1906); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 396-98. 
20. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 
231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). See generally Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 
(1934); F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 122-37; FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11 , at 395- 
423. 
21. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 376 (9th Cir. 1965). 
22. Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976). 
23. Id.; Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). 
24. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 
947 (8th Cir. 1905). 
25. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 376 (9th Cir. 1965). Tribal courts operate 
on some Indian reservations under the authority of the Indian tribe. Powers held by the 
tribal courts are derived from the sovereignty of the tribe itself. The Eighth Circuit aptly 
explained this derivation of authority from the tribe in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 
231 F.2d 89, 91 (8th Cir. 1956): 
The plaintiffs would argue that there is found no provision in the Federal 
Constitution for Indian courts. None is necessary . . . . [Vhe Constitution, by 
authorizing Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes and by au- 
thorizing the making of treaties with them, while not in and of itself establishing 
the sovereignty of the tribes, nevertheless does recognize their sovereignty. As 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, that sovereignty is absolute 
excepting only as to such rights as are taken away by the paramount govern- 
ment, the United States. Under this view, not even a Congressional Act would 
be necessary to establish the legality of the Oglala Sioux Tribal Courts. How- 
ever, regulatory powers over these judicial establishments have been exercised 
to promote uniformity, gradual assimilation and other ends. 
In contrast, other Indian reservations have Courts of Indian Offenses, created by the 
authority given the Secretary of the Department of Interior by Congress. M. PRICE, LAW 
AND THE AMERICAN I DIAN 129 (1973). The Commissioner of Indian Affairs is specifically 
authorized to promulgate regulations with regard to Courts of Indian Offenses. 25 U.S.C. 
4 2 (1970). The Suquamish court that exercised jurisdiction over Oliphant was an Indian 
tribal court. 544 F.2d at 1009. 
26. 25 U.S.C. 4 1302 (1970); 25 C.F.R. 4 4 11.1-.87NH (1976); see Ortiz-Barraza v. 
United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975); Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 
376 (9th Cir. 1965). 
27. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
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treaties and  statute^."^^ Thus, while the doctrine of residual sov- 
ereignty has been invoked to justify many powers of self- 
government, jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit criminal 
offenses upon Indians has been permitted heretofore only when 
specifically authorized by treaty. 
B. Federal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians Committing Crimes 
on Reservations 
Under a number of early treaties between the federal govern- 
ment and Indian tribes, the tribes were allowed jurisdiction over 
nowIndians committing crimes within Indian country.2g Treaties 
with the Suquamish Tribe, however, are silent on this subject.30 
In addition to treaties, federal statutes affect the criminal 
jurisdiction of tribal courts. One of the earliest of these statutes, 
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790,31 designated the method 
of handling non-Indians who committed crimes against Indians 
within Indian country.32 The act provided that such crimes and 
offenses were to be tried in the federal courts.J3 Subsequent revi- 
sions of the actJ4 retained the provision for federal criminal juris- 
diction over non-Indians. On the other hand, the revisions did not 
provide for jurisdiction over Indians who committed crimes 
against other Indians within Indian country.35 Thus, for such 
28. Id. a t  172. In McClamhan, the Court, citing an 1868 treaty with the Navajo tribe, 
invoked the doctrine of residual sovereignty to prevent the State of Arizona from levying 
an income tax on Indians earning income on the reservation. 
The McClanahan standard was met in the recent case of United States v. Mazurie, 
419 U.S. 544 (1975). There, the Court referred to 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970) for authority 
that Indian tribes are permitted to regulate the sale of liquor on the reservation, even if 
sold by non-Indians doing business on lands held by non-Indians within the limits of the 
reservation. 
29. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 6 & n.48. 
30. 544 F.2d a t  1010. 
31. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). 
32. Id. § 5: 
[Ijf any citizen or inhabitant of the United States . . . shall go into any town, 
settlement or territory belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians, and shall 
there commit any crime upon, or trespass against, the person or property of any 
peaceable and friendly Indian . . . [the offender] shall be subject to the same 
punishment, and shall be proceeded against in the same manner as if the offence 
had been committed within the jurisdiction of the state or [territorial] district 
to which he . . . may belong, against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof. 
33. Id. 4 6. 
34. For a brief history of subsequent revisions of the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act, 
see FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 323-24. 
35. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1817, the second permanent Trade and Inter- 
course Act, contained this provision: 
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crimes Indian tribes were allowed exclusive jurisdiction over their 
members.36 
This unqualified tribal jurisdiction was limited by the Ap- 
propriations Act of 1885.37 This act granted federal courts exclu- 
sive jurisdiction over Indians who committed any of seven major 
offenses against other I n d i a n ~ . ~ ~  The current version of this provi- 
sion extends federal jurisdiction to fourteen major crimes.3v 
The current relevant versions of the 1790 Act40 and the 1885 
Act ,41 however, do not expressly grant federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes against Indians 
within Indian country.42 Nevertheless, federal and state courts, 
[Sluperior courts . .. . and circuit courts and other courts of the United States, 
of similar jurisdiction in criminal causes . . . shall have . . . full power and 
authority to hear, try, and punish, all crimes . . . against this act . . . : 
Provided, That nothing in this act shall be so construed . . . to extend to any 
offence committed by one Indian against another, within any Indian boundary. 
Ch. 42, 4 2, 3 Stat. 383 (1817). 
36. This pronouncement of jurisdiction over crimes by Indians against Indians was 
seen by Cohen as recognition of tribal "self government." F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 362. 
37. Ch. 341, § 9,23 Stat. 385 (1885). This act was passed in response to the Supreme 
Court decision in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which held that the courts of 
the United States were without criminal jurisdiction over a Sioux Indian who had mur- 
dered another Indian on an Indian reservation. The Court stated that such jurisdiction 
had not been conferred upon the lower federal courts by Congress. Id. at 572. 
38. Ch. 341, 4 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885). The seven offenses were murder, manslaughter, 
rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. 
39. 18 U.S.C.A. Q 1153 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (in part): 
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian 
or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, 
kidnaping, rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not 
attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit murder, assault 
with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, bur- 
glary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country, shall be subject to the 
same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offen- 
ses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 
40. 18 U.S.C. Q 1152 (1970): 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within 
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of 
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any 
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the 
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over 
such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
41. Note 39 supra. 
42. This fact was emphasized by the majority in the instant case. 544 F.2d at 1010- 
11; note 61 and accompanying text infra. 
Though unmentioned in the statutes, crimes committed against non-Indians on reser- 
vations, whether by Indians or non-Indians, have historically been punishable in federal 
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with the exception of the district court and the Ninth Circuit in 
the instant case, have consistently read such a grant into the 
statutes." In Ex parte Kenyon," the court directly addressed the 
question of whether a federal court or an Indian tribal court was 
empowered to exercise jurisdiction over a non-Indian who had 
allegedly committed larceny within Indian country." Citing ear- 
lier versions of the current statutes for authority," the court 
stated that for an Indian court to have jurisdiction, the "offender 
must be an Indian, and the one against whom the offence is 
committed must also be an Indian."" Similarly, in Donnelly u. 
United States," the Supreme Court declared that a non-Indian 
who had shot an Indian on the reservation was subject to federal 
rather than state jurisdiction. Other courts have reached the 
same conclusions as the Kenyon and Donnelly courts.49 
and state courts respectively. See Apapas v. United States, 233 U.S. 587 (1914) (Indian 
against non-Indian); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) (nowIndian against 
nowIndian); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896) (non-Indian tribal member 
against non-Indian); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (non-Indian against 
non-Indian). See also FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 320-22, 324-25. 
Several tribal codes, including the Suquamish Law and Order Code, supra note 2, 
claim tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes within Indian country. 
AMERICAN I DIAN LAWYER T AINING PROGRAM, INc., MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW D-4 n.43 (1976). 
43. Notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra. The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. 8 13 (1970), incorporates "the criminal laws of the several States into the laws of 
the United States so that violations will be prosecuted as Federal offenses." FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 308. Therefore, even actions which are criminal under state 
law and not under federal statute are tried by federal courts. The sole exception to this is 
where the state has assumed complete jurisdiction over all civil and criminal Indian cases 
as authorized by the United States. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280,67 Stat. 
588. The State of Washington does not retain this power. 544 F.2d at 1012. 
44. 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720). 
45. The court in Kenyon questioned whether a crime was indeed committed and, if 
so, whether it was within Indian country. The court left unresolved the first question but 
concluded that whatever questionable act did take place was transacted "beyond the 
place over which the Indian court had jurisdiction." Id. at 355. This indicates that not 
only are the person and act important factors in determining whether Indian courts have 
jurisdiction, but also that location must be considered. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 358. 
46. 14 F. Cas. at 355. 
47. Id. 
48. 228 U.S. 243 (1913). 
49. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 n.5 (1959); Williams v. United States, 
327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946); United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1933); United 
States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 468 (1926); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 451-52 
(1914); In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 577-79 (1891); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571- 
72 (1883); State v. Kuntz, 66 N.W.2d 531 (N.D. 1954). 
Recently, however, and prior to the instant case, the Ninth Circuit had described the 
issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians as "an unanswered question." Que- 
chan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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C .  Government Policy and Indian Self-Government 
The concept of tribal self-government has generally been ac- 
cepted." Actions taken by Congress, however, have only sporadi- 
cally supported this notion; during the past two centuries, con- 
gressional policies have ranged from termination of Indian tribal 
units to preservation of the same.51 More recently, Congress has 
sought to assimilate Indians while on the reservation and to pre- 
serve the concept of self-government .52 This policy of assimilation 
has been followed to the present with few  exception^.^^ 
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 196B5' illustrates the congres- 
50. See generally FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 395-454. 
51. Government dealings with the Indians under the line of 19th century congres- 
sional policies included removal and placement on reservations, implementation of pro- 
grams for educating and civilizing the Indians, withdrawal from the tribes of the right to 
make treaties, and the allotment of tribal lands to individual Indians with a view to 
terminating the tribal units and preparing the Indians for citizenship. For an historical 
look at these governmental actions, see S. ~ ~ L E R ,  A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 5-6, 54-91 
(1973); BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICIES 
FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD THROUGH T E EARLY 1970's 6-7 (1974); Martone, American 
Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent Right or Congressional 
License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW 600 (1976). 
Specifically, the permitting of treatymaking by the tribes ended with passage of the 
Indian Appropriation Act of 1871. The act provided that "no Indian nation or tribe within 
the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent 
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty." Ch. 120, 5 
1, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (current version a t  25 U.S.C. 5 71 (1970)). 
52. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, a t  10-13; Martone, supra note 51, at 607- 
18. See also Indian Reorganization Act of 1834, 25 U.S.C. 5 5 461-478 (1970). This statute 
halted the allotment process and provided for the stabilization of the "tribal organization 
by vesting such tribal organization with real, though limited, authority" for self- 
government. S. REP. NO. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). 
53. See generally S. TYLER, supra note 51, at 151-234. The salient exception to this 
policy appeared in H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953), which 
called for termination of the guardiadward relationship between the federal government 
and the Indians. This trend was short-lived, however, and gave way to "New Directions 
in the 1960's." See generally BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICIES FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD THROUGH THE EARLY 1970's 10-12 
(1974). 
54. 25 U.S.C. 5 1302 (1970): 
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall - 
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; 
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de- 
scribing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized; 
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; 
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; 
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation; 
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public 
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sional intent to assimilate the Indians. That act incorporated into 
federal Indian law a modified version of the safeguards furnished 
in the United States Bill of RightsSS which had been held-by the 
Supreme Court to be inapplicable to Indian tribal  government^.^" 
Thus, the Indian Civil Rights Act provides an important set of 
tools for adopting Indians into American culture without termi- 
nating their tribal organization. 
Resolution of the jurisdictional issue in the instant case re- 
quires consideration not only of federal Indian policy but also of 
the doctrine of residual sovereignty and the historical exclusivity 
of federal jurisdiction in non-Indian cases. These considerations 
will be examined in the analysis in an attempt to settle the crimi- 
nal jurisdiction question in the instant case. 
In affirming the denial of Oliphant's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the argument that Indian tribunals lack criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Oliphant claimed that the current 
relevant portion of the 1790 Act, 18 U.S.C. section 1152,57 effec- 
tively strips Indian courts of jurisdiction over all except I n d i a n ~ . ~ ~  
The court acknowledged that section 1152 extends federal crimi- 
nal jurisdiction to Indian country, but indicated that the provi- 
sion does not extinguish tribal jurisdiction nor declare federal 
- - - -  
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining wit- 
nesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for 
his defense; 
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual pun- 
ishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty 
or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of 
$500, or both; 
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or 
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law; 
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or 
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the 
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons. 
For a comparison of the United States Bill of Rights with the rights provided in this 
act, see note 93 infra. 
55. See note 93 infra. 
56. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); accord, Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 
1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1976); Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional 
Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1344 & n.6 (1969). 
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970). 
58. 544 F.2d at 1010. 
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jurisdiction to be ex~lusive.~~ 
Moreover, rather than limiting tribal jurisdiction, the court 
asserted that the history of section 1152 evinces an intention to 
prevent Indians from being subject to the double jeopardy of both 
tribal discipline and federal court rule.' The court reasoned that, 
according to the principle of residual sovereignty, Indian tribes 
continued to hold unimpaired their right to exercise jurisdiction 
over offenders entering their boundaries because Congress had 
not expressly declared federal jurisdiction to be exc l~s ive .~~ 
The majority asserted that "practical considerations," based 
on historical animosity existing between Indians and nearby state 
residents, supported granting jurisdiction to Indian tribes be- 
cause crimes committed on reservations by nowIndians might 
well go other wise ~nredressed.'~ The court also stated that the 
policies of the United States would not be frustrated by such a 
holding.63 Since the federal government has encouraged Indian 
tribes to adopt law and order codes, set up tribal courts, and 
exercise authority over reservation lands, allowing the tribal court 
jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders for criminal actions as lim- 
ited by the Indian Bill of Rights is a "small but necessary part of 
this policy."64 
Oliphant's second argument, that a fair trial before the tribal 
court would be impossible since non-Indians would be excluded 
from the jury venire, was summarily dismissed by the court as 
premature .65 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kennedy contended that the 
congressional intent never was to give Indian courts criminal ju- 
risdiction over non- Ind ian~ .~~  Disagreeing with the majority's 
reading of concurrent jurisdiction into section 1152, the dissent 
stated that "[ilt seems extremely anomalous that Congress 
would provide for exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts for 
major offenses committed by Indians, but permit tribal courts to 
try non-Indians for these same major  offense^."^ The more rea- 
p-- p p p 
59. Id. at 1010-11. 
60. Id. at 1010-11 & 1010 n.3. 
61. Id. at 1009 & n.1. 
62. Id. at 1013. 
63. Id. at 1012-13. 
64. Id. at 1013. 
65. Id. at 1011-12. 
66. To substantiate this conclusion, the dissent relied on the history of 18 U.S.C. $ 4  
1152-1153 (1970) and administrative declarations of a lack of tribal jurisdiction over non- 
Indians. Id. at 1014-19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. at 1018 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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sonable inference, the dissent argued, is that Congress intended 
tribal court jurisdiction to extend no further than to Indian of- 
fenders ? 
Moreover, the doctrine of residual sovereignty should be in- 
applicable to the question of criminal jurisdiction, the dissent 
stated, since such a notion has been relied upon only in cases of 
state encroachment into areas of tribal self-go~ernrnent.~~ Simi- 
larly, because even as to Indians the tribal courts have jurisdic- 
tion only over minor offenses, Judge Kennedy found the exercise 
of tribal criminal jurisdicion over nonmembers to be nonessential 
"to the tribe's identity or its self-governing status."70 
The Ninth Circuit resolved the jurisdictional issue of the 
instant case by invoking the doctrine of residual sovereignty and 
relying on a reading of section 1152 as providing for concurrent 
federal and tribal court juri~diction.~~ This analysis will examine 
the merit of the court's rationale and then focus on underlying 
policy considerations that support the conclusion reached but do 
so on grounds other than those principally relied upon by the 
Ninth Circuit. 
A. Inapplicability of the Residual Sovereignty Concept 
The majority's residual sovereignty argument rests on con- 
gressional silence. Since no express statutory limitation on the 
criminal jurisdiction of Indian courts over non-Indians exists, the 
Ninth Circuit found that there had been no curtailment of the 
original criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by Indian nations.72 
The doctrine of original sovereignty was first introduced as 
a check on state encroachment of tribal government, and applica- 
tion of the concept has previously been limited to cases involving 
state infringement on tribal rights and to cases justifying Indian 
governments' regulation of business on  reservation^.'^ According 
to the limited application standard announced by the Supreme 
Court in M~Clanahan ,~~ residual sovereignty should be viewed as 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. 
71. Notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra. 
72. Note 61 and accompanying text supra. 
73. Notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra. 
74. Notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra. 
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merely a backdrop against which pertinent treaties and federal 
statutes should be examined when determining issues of state 
infringement. Since neither state encroachment nor regulation of 
business on the reservation is a t  issue here, the applicability of 
the doctrine of residual sovereignty is questionable. 
The concept of residual sovereignty has never been extended 
to include criminal jurisdiction over n~n-Indians.'~ Federal cases 
since Ex parte Kenyon have uniformly held that federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes 
against Indians. Since 1834, administrative agencies empowered 
with responsibility over Indians and Indian affairs have also fol- 
lowed a pattern consistent with the disallowance of tribal crimi- 
nal jurisdi~tion.~~ Moreover, Congress has not acted to change 
this interpretation of federal law.77 In addition, the current Law 
and Order Code promulgated by the Department of Interior for 
the regulation of courts of Indian  offense^'^ provides that these 
courts have jurisdiction over only Indians for criminal matters 
and overanon-Indians only with their consent for civil matters.'" 
Until recently,80 some tribal judges themselves have stated that 
75. Text accompanying note 28 supra. 
76. It appears that the earliest pronouncement of the lack of tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians committing crimes within Indian country was in an opinion by the Attorney 
General: 
[ y h e  25th section of the act of the 30th of June, 1834, declares that so much 
of the laws of the United States as provides for the punishment of crimes com- 
mitted within any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States, shall be in force in the Indian country; with a proviso, that the same shall 
not extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person and property 
of another: thus evidently proceeding on the supposition that, under the treaties 
in relation to the Indian country west of the Mississippi, the Indian laws would 
only be applicable to Indians themselves. 
Jurisdiction of the Choctaw Courts, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 693, 695 (1834). See also Powers of 
Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 56-64 (1934); Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Choctaw 
Nation, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 174, 179 (1855). 
77. 544 F.2d at 1016 n.7 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For a brief explanation of the 
potential exception to exclusive federal jurisdiction, see note 43 supra. 
78. For a discussion of these courts, see note 25 supra. 
79. Relevant portions of the Law and Order Code provide: 
A Court of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction over all [criminal offen- 
ses enumerated in the Law and Order Code], when committed by any Indian, 
within the reservation or reservations for which the court is established . . . . 
. . . . 
The Courts of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction of all [civil] suits 
wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within their jurisdic- 
tion, and of all other [civil] suits between members and nonmembers which 
are brought before the courts by stipulation of both parties. 
25 C.F.R. §§  11.2-.22 (1976). 
80. Note 42 supra (discussing the current trend of Indian tribal codes to include 
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tribal courts have had no jurisdiction over non-Indian~.~~ Finally, 
even commentators favoring the grant of jurisdiction over non- 
Indians to tribal courts have unanimously recognized that those 
courts presently lack such jurisdi~tion.~~ 
It appears, therefore, that to extend residual sovereignty to 
include criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would be, as the 
dissent claims, a "novel and unusual" application of the doctrine 
and inconsistent with prior practice.83 In the face of statements 
by administrative agencies, decisions of federal courts, and com- 
mentaries by leading scholars all affirming exclusive federal juris- 
diction, congressional silence on the subject most likely evidences 
approval of the accepted interpretation. 
B. Statutory and Constitutional Considerations 
I .  Reevaluation of federal statutes 
The court in the instant case claimed that the purpose of 
section 1152 was not to prohibit Indian tribes from prosecuting 
non-Indians but rather was to protect Indians from double jeop- 
a r d ~ . ~ ~  The court maintained that the failure of section 1152 to 
"protect non-Indians against double jeopardy does not indicate 
that only Indians were susceptible to federal and tribal disci- 
 line."^^ The court stated that the statutory protection of only 
Indians from double jeopardy might be explained by the fact that 
the only person to have suffered double punishment before the 
enactment of the provision was an Indian?' More likely, however, 
the reason that express protection for non-Indians from double 
jeopardy was not drafted into section 1152 was because the double 
jeopardy threat was not applicable to non-Indians since they were 
not subject to tribal jurisdiction in the first place. 
The court also maintained that the extension of federal crim- 
inal laws to Indian country by section 1152 was not a declaration 
of exclusive federal jurisdi~tion.~' The cessation of granting crimi- 
claims of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians upon the reservation). 
81. See, e.g., Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 
1st & 2d Sess. 385, 679 (1961-1962) (testimony of Shirley Nelson, Hualapai tribal judge, 
and Cato W. Valandra, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribal Council). 
82. See, e.g., M. PRICE, supra note 25, at 174; Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Indian Country in Arizona, 1 A m .  L. REV. 62, 92-94 (1959). 
83. 544 F.2d at 1014 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
84. Id. at 1011. 
85. Id. at 1010 n.3. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1010. 
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nal jurisdiction over non-Indians by treaty,88 the numerous pro- 
nouncements by federal courts and administrative agencies," and 
the provisions of the Law and Order Code,D0 however, all indicate 
that federal jurisdiction is exclusive. 
The Ninth Circuit's reading of section 1152 as not granting 
exclusive federal jurisdiction falters on yet another ground. Sec- 
tion 1152 declares federal jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
Indian country against Indians except when committed by other 
Indians. The following section, the current relevant portion of the 
1885 Act, however, empowers federal courts exclusively to try 
even those cases which involve only Indians when the offense 
committed is one of the specified major crimes. Section 1153, it  
is important to note, makes no mention of federal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians committing these major crimes. Thus, if juris- 
diction over non-Indians is not vested exclusively in federal 
courts, as the majority contends, then Indian tribal courts could 
arguably assume jurisdiction over even major crimes committed 
by non-Indians against Indians within Indian country. Such a 
result is manifestly untenable and inconsistent with the apparent 
intent and purpose of sections 1152 and 1153.s1 
2. Examination of constitutionul considerations 
In dismissing as premature Oliphant's argument that a fair 
trial would be impos~ible,~~ the Ninth Circuit skirted a constitu- 
tional issue of major import. Since numerous basic rights afforded 
defendants in federal and state courts are not required in tribal 
courts,Q3 it may be violative of the Constitution to subject non- 
Indian United States citizens to the criminal jurisdiction of tribal 
88. Note 29 and accompanying text supra. Cohen reports only two treaties made after 
July 22, 1790, that allowed Indian tribes to subject non-Indians within Indian temtory to 
the laws of the Indians. F. COHEN, supra note 1, a t  6 n.48. 
89. Notes 44-49, 76 and accompanying text supra. 
90. Notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra. 
91. Notes 31-43 and accompanying text supra. 
92. 544 F.2d at 1011-12. 
93. Among the-rights not expressly mentioned in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 
U.S.C. Q 1302 (1970), are the following: (1) the right of the people to keep and bear arms; 
(2) the right to be free from having to quarter soldiers in one's house without consent; (3) 
the provision that no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; (4) the right to an impartial 
jury and to have the trial in the area wherein the crime was committed; (5) the right to a 
jury trial for civil matters at common law involving $20 or more, and the right to be free 
from having a fact, previously tried by a jury, reexamined by any court of the United 
States except as provided by common law; (6) the right to counsel; and (7) the rights 
enumerated in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 
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courts. When viewed in this light, the past refusal of federal 
courts to relinquish jurisdiction over non-Indians may be par- 
tially due to a feeling that non-Indian citizens should not be 
subject to courts that are fundamentally distinguishable in com- 
position and orientation from federal and state courts. 
Among the rights not guaranteed Oliphant in the tribal court 
was the right to an impartial jury. Since the Suquamish constitu- 
tion provides no opportunity for non-Indians to participate in any 
form of tribal governmentg4 even though non-Indians far outnum- 
ber Indians on reservation lands,g5 Oliphant may be subjected to' 
an unfair trial." Other basic rights subject to modification in 
tribal courts include those guaranteed by the equal protection 
and due process clauses of the Constitution. Several federal 
courts have held that the corresponding clauses in the Indian 
Civil Rights Act are not to be given the same meaning as the 
clauses in the Const i t~t ion.~~ 
Additional legal and cultural distinctions accentuate the dif- 
ferences between tribal courts and state or federal courts. Tribal 
judges are not required to be attorneys nor to have studied law.g8 
Some tribes allow defendants appearing before tribal courts to be 
represented only by "non-attorney representatives as counsel."9g 
Due to cultural differences between Indians and non-Indians, the 
common law often is inapplicable to interpret Indian tribal ordi- 
nances or laws to which non-Indians may be subject.lW Finally, 
94. Brief for Appellant at 20, Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976). 
95. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, No. 
76-5729 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1976). 
96. Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that the "concept of the jury trial 
contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community." Taylor v. Louis- 
iana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (appeal challenged a state jury selection system that ex- 
cluded most women from service); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (non-Negro's suc- 
cessful challenge of practice of excluding Blacks from grand and petit jury service). Under 
the Peters holding, not only could Oliphant have challenged the Suquamish policy of 
excluding non-Indians from jury service, but defendant members of the Suquamish Tribe 
could likely also challenge the procedure. 
97. E.g., Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 
1143 (D.S.D. 1974); Curdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973). 
98. 25 C.F.R. 8 11.3(d) (1976); Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional 
Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343,1357 (1969); Note, The Indian: The 
Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818,1832-33 (1968). Efforts to improve the quality 
of Indian courts, however, are being made. See generally A. GEIS & C. RICHARDS, INDIAN 
J u s n c ~  A GUIDE TO PLANNING. 
99. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal 
Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1357 (1969). This rule, however, has been rejected 
by at least one federal district court. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). 
See also AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., supra note 42, at B-5, B-6. 
100. E.g., Ex parte Tiger, 47 S.W. 304, 305 (Indian Ten. Ct. App. 1898). 
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the maximum sentence that can be imposed by an Indian tribal 
court is limited to a fine and six months in jail.lol 
When the differences in rights afforded Oliphant in federal 
and tribal court are considered, strong reason appears why the 
appellant in the instant case should not be subjected to the crimi- 
nal jurisdiction of the tribal court. It would be incongruous to 
cause a citizen of a "conquering" nationlo2 to be subject to courts 
of the "conquered" nation, especially when the conquered na- 
tion's guarantees of fairness are limited when compared with 
those of the conquering nation. 
Although they are not required to provide every constitu- 
tional safeguard, some Indian courts may in fact provide or be 
capable of providing these rights to all parties before them. If this 
is the case, there remains little reason to deny these courts some 
degree of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The assessment 
of constitutional quality of tribal courts, however, is more consis- 
tent with the activities of Congress than with those of the federal 
judiciary. Perhaps the time has come for Congress, charged with 
the duty of regulating Indian affairs,lo3 to conduct such an evalua- 
tion of individual Indian courts and to expressly grant criminal 
jurisdiction to qualifying tribunals. Until this occurs, however, 
the federal courts may be required to make the assessment. 
C. Policy Considerations 
The criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes has been contin- 
ually reduced since their conquest.lo4 Granting jurisdiction over 
non-Indians is inconsistent with this trend. Countervailing poli- 
cies and pressures of modern society, however, cast doubt on the 
propriety of continually reducing tribal powers. 
The strongest policy argument for reversing this trend and 
allowing Indian courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non- 
Indians is that such jurisdiction is a sine qua non of Indian self- 
101. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1970). In this regard the Indian tribal courts resemble 
justice of the peace courts. Unlike a justice of the peace court, however, a tribal court must 
provide a jury upon request if imprisonment is a possible'sentence. Id. § 1302(10). See 
Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 
HAW. L. REV. 1343, 1356 (1969). Thus, the Supreme Court's decision that a defendant 
does not have a right to a jury trial for "petty offenses" which carry sentences of less than 
six months imprisonment, Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974), does not apply 
to Indian courts because of the provision in 25 U.S.C. 4 1302 (1970) requiring juries upon 
request. 
102. See generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
103. Note 9 and accompanying text supra. 
104. Notes 31-43 and accompanying text supra. 
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government. Indians on reservations suffer unjustly because non- 
Indians committing criminal offenses on reservations go unpun- 
ished in large measure since federal and state authorities have 
demonstrated a disinterest in actively prosecuting these cases.lo5 
This hiatus in the legal process must be eliminated, and allowing 
Indians to prosecute matters occurring within their country seems 
to partially answer this need. 
Even if criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians were not an 
elementary part of self-government, such a jurisdictional grant 
would be consistent with the present policy of assimilation.lo8 
Such a grant would strengthen the self-regulating power of tribes 
and acknowledge the progress made by Indian nations in assimi- 
lating the American culture into reservation life. 
Nevertheless, a grant of criminal jurisdiction over non- 
Indians may jeoparize some tribal independence by eliminating 
some cultural and legal dissimilarities. Presently, interpretation 
of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Indian Bill 
of Rights in the Indian Civil Rights Act takes into account the 
basic interests of the tribe and its cultural autonomy.lo7 Similarly, 
Indian ordinances may be interpreted other than by common law 
definitions.lo8 If constitutional safeguards are to be guaranteed to 
non-Indians brought before tribal courts, uniformity of legal sys- 
tems must be achieved, requiring the abandonment of these indi- 
vidualistic interpretations. Once uniformity is achieved, much of 
the necessity and justification for retaining two identical systems 
of justice would dissolve. The possibility would then arise that a t  
least some tribal courts would be eliminated. 
The grant of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, 
likely will not unduly hasten the complete assimilation of Indian 
tribes.log Yet, it must be recognized that a grant to Indian tribes 
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in an attempt to pro- 
105. See, e.g., 544 F.2d at 1013-14; Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciap, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 383-90 (1961) (testimony of Shirley Nelson, Haulapai 
tribal judge, and Cipriano J. Manuel, Papago chief tribal judge). 
106. Notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. 
107. Note 97 and accompanying textsupra. 
108. Note 100 and accompanying text supra. 
109. Indeed, it has been suggested that federal policy is beginning to reflect a sensitiv- 
ity to the unique concerns of Indians and "is slowly moving away from the approach of 
implementing programs based upon what the non-Indian considered to be in the best 
interests of the Indian." Article, The Allocation of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Coun- 
t~--Federal,  State and Tribal Relationships, 8 U .  CAL. D.L. REV. 431, 451 (1975). Any 
such shift in policy would result in modification of the present policy of assimilation. 
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mote Indian self-government is also a step toward what appears 
to be an inevitable, and to some an undesirable, continuance of 
assimilation of Indian peoples into American culture. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit declared the existence of tribal jurisdic- 
tion over non-Indians by invoking a "novel and unusual" applica- 
tion of the doctrine of residual sovereignty and a reading of con- 
current federalnndian jurisdiction in federal statutes. Histori- 
cally, tribes have lacked such jurisdiction and courts and admin- 
istrative agencies have uniformly supported this view. Given this 
historical precedent, the holding of the instant case cannot be 
reasonably justified by either the doctrine of residual sovereignty 
or the statute. 
A departure from the past trend of restricting tribal jurisdic- 
tion should not be made without substantial justification. In light 
of the consistent indifference of federal and state authorities to 
prosecuting non-Indian committed crimes, however, an extension 
of limited authority to tribal courts to try non-Indians may be 
defensible. A grant of such jurisdiction would assist tribes to pre- 
serve order upon the reservations. 
Congress should bear the responsibility to statutorily remedy 
this jurisdictional issue after evaluating the constitutional safe- 
guards currently obtaining in Indian tribal court procedures and 
after appraising the impact that expanding tribal jurisdiction 
would have on broad national policies. Pending such congres- 
sional action, courts should exercise restraint before overturning 
the two-century pattern of denying Indians criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. 
